SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

Countries: Afghanistan; + 19 more
Sources: SIPRI
Publication date: June 13, 2002

Highlights from the SIPRI YEARBOOK 2002
Security and conflicts

The 15 most deadly conflicts in 2001-those that killed over 100 people-were all intra-state conflicts, but all of them were directly affected by external actors and 11 of them spilled over international borders. 11 of the conflicts have lasted for eight or more years.

51 multilateral peace operations were operational during 2001.

There were no new UN peace missions in 2001 for the first time since 1996.

The International Security Assistance Force operation in Afghanistan was launched on a British initiative on the basis of a UN mandate. Some 4700 military personnel from 18 countries are taking part. More than 30 states have made military contributions.

The 11 September attacks brought home to the EU the reality of its role in the transatlantic relationship. This will influence the division of labour and com-plementarity between Europe and the USA and will increase pressure on Europe to improve its military capabil-ities in both the EU and NATO.

Increased importance is being attached to developing coopera-tion with the armed forces, intel-ligence services and law-enforcement services of states to identify groups and indi-viduals engaged in terrorist acts. There is a risk that security sector reform will become subordi-nate to anti-terrorism activities in countries where the development of this coopera-tion is seen as particu-larly important.

During 2001 sanctions continued to play an important role in efforts to manage a range of security problems. Both the United Nations and the European Union have been working to improve the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument for managing inter-national security problems.

Military spending and armaments

World military expenditure in 2001 is estimated at $839 billion (in cur-rent dollars), accounting for 2.6 % of world gross domestic product and a world average of $137 per capita. Five countries account for over half and the 15 maor spenders account for more than three-quarters of total world military expenditure.

The high-income countries-the industrialized countries and those in the Middle East- have the highest per capita military spending. The developing countries-particularly the low and middle income countries in Africa and the Middle East-have the heaviest eco-nomic burden in terms of GDP share.

The process of concentration in the arms industry has produced several extraordinarily large companies, each producing military goods and services with an annual value of $5-$19 billion. Concentration has moved from the national to the inter-national level. Inter-nationalization in Europe is seen as a pre-requis-ite for Europe to become competitive with the USA and for estab-lish-ing military industrial partnerships with US companies.

A 24% increase in arms transfers made Russia the largest arms supplier in 2001.China was by far the largest arms recipient in 2001 after an increase of 44% from 2000. Imports by India increased by 50%, making it the third largest recipient in 2001.

Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

US President George W. Bush's announcement that the USA would withdraw from the ABM Treaty was greeted with a restrained reaction from Russia, China and US allies. The decision cleared the way for the USA to develop a ballistic missile defence system larger in scale and scope than the limited system envisaged by the Clinton Administration.

Against the background of improved political relations, Russia and the USA agreed in November to negotiate a new arms reduction deal which would reduce by the year 2012 the strategic offensive nuclear forces of each country to 1700-2200 operationally deployed nuclear warheads, but not require the elimination of warheads removed from service, rais-ing concern over reduced confidence and greater unpredictability in nuclear force postures.

Two questions are at the root of US concerns about the role of arms control. The first is how to respond when parties violate an agree-ment to which they are a party. The second is whether arms control processes and agreements can mod-ify the behaviour of key states.

The total world nuclear stockpile consists of over 36 800 warheads. In addition to deployed nuclear warheads, thousands more are held in reserve and are not counted in official declarations. The proportion of 'unaccountable warheads', including spares, those in active and inactive storage and 'pits' (plutonium cores), has increased in recent years.

There is concern that increased reliance on, and new missions for, tactical nuclear weapons can be expected. Concerns are exacerbated by the continued lack of trans-parency surrounding their numbers and operational status.

The magnitude of the changes that are needed to protect nuclear material against terrorist attacks has not been widely appreciated. There is evidence that terrorists and thieves have already threatened or attacked nuclear facilities and tried to purchase or steal nuclear and other radioactive material.

At the end of 2001, the USA had nearly 110 operational mili-tary-related satellites, accounting for well over two-thirds of all military satellites orbiting the earth; Russia had about 40 and the rest of the world about 20. The issue of the 'weaponization' of outer space has reappeared on the arms control agenda.

In 2001 the USA rejected a draft pro-tocol to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and proposed that the negotiating mandate of the ad hoc group which had drafted the protocol be terminated.

Without US participation, the effect-iveness and viability of arms control and disarmament regimes would be signific-antly reduced. Specific US concerns regarding each agreement should be addressed through the use of technical and semi-technical analyses with which the political leadership of other countries can engage US political leadership.

Although the European model of conventional arms control measures is seen as a positive example, conventional arms control remains a low security priority elsewhere in the world.

There are now 41 states that participate in one or more of the 5 multilateral weapon and technology export regimes and 27 states participate in all of them.

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Press release

'The 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States marked a watershed in the international security process. . . . The qualitatively novel phenomena and changes in the world call for a new, unconventional approach. Since the risks are global, the responses should be global as well. This, in turn, requires a system that fosters and generates cooperation rather than rivalry among powers and other actors. The world is interdependent. Positive and negative processes and phenomena are of a global character. The greatest challenge of the contemporary world is not so much the rivalry over power or territorial expansion-motives that dominated in the colonial era--as it is dealing with the new threats of global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime, on the one hand, and local and regional conflicts on the other. . . .

The adaptation of the cooperative security system to new tasks calls for the elaboration of new principles and norms adequate to the requirements of the contemporary world. International structures, institutions and organizations are also being reassessed, since they have so far not been able to address effectively the needs and challenges of global processes and the accelerated modernization in the world today.'

Introduction: Global security after 11 September 2001

Presentation by Adam Daniel Rotfeld

* Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA marked a watershed in the international security process. The policies and mutual relations of the USA, Russia and many other states have changed. Combating terrorism has become a matter of the highest priority. However, the transatlantic community is confronted with a disagreement over the main aim: whether to focus on disrupting and defeating the al-Qaeda network or eliminating the roots of terrorism with a broader range of policies.

The International Security Assistance Force Operation was launched on a British initiative on the basis of a UN mandate. The operation was envisaged to last 6 months. Some 4700 military personnel from 17 European countries and New Zealand are taking part. The operation is under the command of the UK, which is to hand it over to Turkey in June 2002. At various stages of the operation, more than 30 states have made military contributions.

In spite of the many declarations and UN Security Council resolutions, expectations of a global response on the prevention of terrorism fell flat-both globally, in the United Nations, and regionally, in NATO. Although the issue concerns domestic and external security, the need for common responses in the security field has not been accepted globally. The interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan reflect the new aspiration to establish international rules for protecting and defending respect for the basic principles and norms of international order. However, there is a lack of internationally recognized legal instruments to effectively tackle situations in which states have traditionally exercised their discretionary power and/or justified their actions as selfdefence.

Four premises are of key importance in shaping a new global security system. The first is that the development and spread of the technologies of 'the network age', particularly information technology, are a part of the process of globalization. The second is that a growing number of states are too weak to control developments on their territory; consequently, they have become a base and an asylum for international crime and terrorist networks. The third is the blurring of the distinction between domestic and external security. The fourth is the growing importance of non-military aspects of state security.

The phenomenon of failed states has various causal factors: the emergence of new states after the collapse of multinational federations; the exposure of poor states to globalization and modernization processes; and higher standards of governance called for by the international community. The stability and efficacy of the state and respect for the norms and rules of law are more important to the maintenance of international order than a state's military potential.

The internal transformation and enlargement of NATO and the EU have accelerated. The states of Central Asia have gained in significance. The policies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are now more salient than those of many European states. The adaptation of the cooperative security system to new tasks calls for the elaboration of new principles and norms adequate to the requirements of the contemporary world. The USA can play a decisive role. It has a position unprecedented in history in terms of military, economic and technological capabilities. In the economic sphere, US national product accounts for 31 per cent of world production. This preponderance both tempts and permits the USA to act unilaterally. However, security is based on interdependence rather than independence or preponderance. While this understanding is reflected in official US statements, in practice the US tendency towards unilateralism in decision making prevails. The world needs the USA as never before, but the USA needs the rest of the world, too. Neither domination and hegemony nor neo-isolationism offer an adequate response to the new challenges.

Chapter 1. Major armed conflicts

Presentation by Taylor B. Seybolt

* Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

All of the 15 most deadly conflicts in 2001-those that caused 100 or more deaths-were intra-state conflicts. The central point of contention in all of the conflicts was control over either government or territory. However, the diversity of state and non-state actors reveals multiple and overlapping objectives related to political power, economic gain and ideological belief.

Despite their intra-state nature, none of the conflicts existed in isolation. All of them were directly influenced by external actors. In most cases, the supply of military matériel by state and sub-state actors and overt military intervention by states served to prolong and intensify the conflicts. Just as commonly, other states and intergovernmental organizations attempted to counteract this type of external influence through mediation and the promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes.

The intra-state conflicts were not only influenced by external actors but also influenced their external environments. Of the 15 conflicts, 11 spilled over international borders in 2001. Most commonly, they threatened to destabilize neighbouring states through the burden of refugees, cross-border movement of rebels (and occasionally national military forces), and the undermining of legitimate economic and political structures by the illicit trade in resources and arms. However, the regional impact of conflict spillover varied. In some cases, the cross-border movement of rebels and arms caused conflicts in neighbouring states to intensify. In other cases, neighbouring states were not significantly affected by conflict spillover.

Eleven of the 15 conflicts have lasted for 8 or more years. One of the reasons for their endurance is the inability of either side to prevail by force. In the vast majority of these conflicts, rebels used a guerrilla military strategy. They supported their military effort through the sale of minerals, timber and narcotics and through remittances from supporters abroad. However, very few groups tried to win the loyalty of the population through political, economic or social programmes. Historically, such programmes have been important elements of successful insurgencies. From the perspective of the government, it is very difficult to win a guerrilla war militarily. It is difficult to use the military's full strength against small and mobile opponents, and even a military victory does not solve the problem that led to the insurgency. Long conflicts, where weak antagonists often attack even weaker targets, cause a large number of civilian casualties and destroy economic and social infrastructure.

Although the general pattern of conflict worldwide in 2001 was consistent with previous years, the priorities and perceptions of many states changed as a result of the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September. The campaign against terrorism by the USA and its allies in the latter part of the year directly influenced a small number of conflicts and had a much wider indirect impact, the full effects of which remain to be seen.

Appendix 1A. Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1990-2001

Presentation by Peter Wallensteen

* Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

In 2001, there were 24 major armed conflicts in 22 locations. Both the number of major armed conflicts and the number of conflict locations in 2001 were slightly lower than in 2000, when there were 25 major armed conflicts in 23 locations. Africa continued to be the region with the greatest number of conflicts. Worldwide, there were approximately equal numbers of contests for control of government and for territory.

In the 12-year post-cold war period 1990-2001 there were 57 different major armed conflicts in 45 different locations. The number of conflicts in 2001 was below the average of around 27 per year since the end of the cold war. The highest number of conflicts for the period 1990-2000 was recorded in 1990-93, and the lowest in 1996 and 1997.

All but 3 of the major armed conflicts registered for 1990-2001 were internal-the issue concerned control over the government or territory of one state. The 3 interstate conflicts in this period were Iraq versus Kuwait, India versus Pakistan and Eritrea versus Ethiopia. Other states contributed regular troops to one side or the other in 15 of the internal conflicts. The year 2001 was overshadowed in September by one new major conflict with qualitatively different, global characteristics which have so far proved difficult to categorize.

Appendix 1B explains the definitions, sources and methods for the data collection presented in appendix 1A

Appendix 1C. Measuring violence: an introduction to conflict data sets

Presentation by Taylor B. Seybolt

* Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

Since the 1980s, with the advent of the widespread use of computers, a multitude of conflict data-collection projects have emerged. As a result, there is disagreement on some of the most basic questions. Is the world more or less violent today than in the past? Are wars more or less destructive than they used to be? Are modern violent conflicts different from earlier ones? What are the causes of conflict initiation, continuation and termination?

In an ironic twist on the presumption of objectivity that underlies the quantitative research projects, the diversity of systematic data collection appears to support the constructivist argument that reality lies in the eye of the beholder. The core issue is the balance between reliability and validity-between accuracy in recording information and appropriateness of the information for addressing theoretical concepts of interest. The balance confronts both quantitative and qualitative attempts to simplify the world in order to understand it and elicits different types of solutions from different types of researchers. Quantitative research places primary importance on reliability. To fulfil the requirement of systematically recording a series of events in a consistent manner, conflict data projects need to delimit complex phenomena through definitions and coding rules. In the process, they limit the range of their validity. The problem of limited validity is partially resolved by the wide variety of data-collection projects that now exist. The reviewed projects offer researchers a vast array of good data with which to develop academic theories and policy-related arguments. Full Internet addresses are given for all of the major conflict data sets.

Chapter 2. Conflict prevention

Presentation by Renata Dwan

* Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, disarmament and international security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

The prevention of violent conflict is a relatively new item on the agenda of multilateral forums. Since the mid-1990s, discussions have focused on the desirability and feasibility of international preventive action. In 2001 the United Nations and the European Union attempted to move conflict prevention from concept to practice. In similar processes both the UN and the EU set out frameworks for the principles of conflict prevention, reviewed existing preventive tools within their organizations, recommended institutional changes to improve and broaden the scope of these instruments, and proposed strategies for intra- and inter-organizational coordination to facilitate the effective implementation of prevention. The comprehensiveness of these reports, the high level at which they were considered and the policies they can potentially lead to mark a coming of age for conflict prevention as a norm in international politics.

Approaches to the threat of terrorism have the potential to incorporate many of the central tenets of conflict prevention. Issues such as the root causes of terrorism, structural and short-term approaches to its prevention, the broad range of state and non-state actors involved, and the multiple tools required to address terrorist threats are precisely the issues with which conflict prevention research and policy making have grappled over the past decade.

Initially, it seemed that international organizations and states might incorporate the preventive framework into their approach to terrorism, but the subsequent global effort has moved away from a preventive focus and has now narrowed to a 'war against terrorism'. In this narrower approach, the preventive concept is severely circumscribed. Prevention of terrorism, as currently practised, consists of measures taken to stop international terrorism, cut off the financial, political and military sources of terrorist support and, where possible, apprehend terrorists before they commit acts of terror. Although this approach employs a broad range of instruments, it is coercive and short-term in character. It is in origin and practice distinct from the concept of conflict prevention elaborated over the past decade and reflected in the UN and EU documents of 2001. Indeed, the current approach to the prevention of terrorism risks undermining the entire notion of conflict prevention.

There is a risk that the prioritization of military relations between states will undermine the important progress forged in the post-cold war world in broadening international affairs so as to take greater account of non-military issues and the legitimate engagement of non-state actors.

The war against terrorism has led to new relationships between states that were formerly at odds with each other. In many cases, these differences centred on the domestic policies of a state. Improved regional and international cooperation to meet common threats may contribute to stability and peace, but the extent to which states such as Pakistan, Sudan or Tajikistan are called upon to assist in the fight against terrorism may constrain the international community's willingness to engage with them on such sensitive questions as governance and human rights. The global effort against international terrorism marks the appearance of a new paradigm in international politics. It is important that it does not undermine the conflict prevention norms that have so recently been established.

Appendix 2A. Multilateral peace missions, 2001

Presentation by Sharon Wiharta and Thomas Papworth

* Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

Appendix 2A presents data on the 51 multilateral peace missions which were initiated, ongoing or terminated in 2001. It also discusses peace missions in the Balkans and Africa and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Chapter 3. The military dimension of the European Union

Zdzislaw Lachowski

About the author

* Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

Ihe ESDP 'Headline Goal'-to be able by 2003 to rapidly deploy a corps level force, for crisis management tasks-has been pursued since the 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting. Efforts have also been made to better meet security threats by implementing the full range of crisis management missions: the 'Petersberg tasks'. Events in 2001 served as a mid-course test for the success of these efforts. The EU is confronted with several major questions: what the ultimate goal and shape of the ESDP will be; how best to pursue the Headline Goal in terms of both institutions and capabilities; and the challenge of politico-military integration.

The 11 September attacks brought home to the EU the reality of its role in the transatlantic relationship. This will influence the division of labour and complementarity between Europe and the USA and increase the pressure on Europe to improve its military capabilities in both the EU and NATO. Building up the ESDP should allow it to shoulder a larger share of the burden of European security, thus rebalancing the transatlantic security relationship. The new military capabilities provided by the ESDP have the potential to help redefine this relationship.

Some EU capability shortcomings were addressed wholly or in part in 2001, but the EU plans concerning the most critical aspects of its European Rapid Reaction Force are either still encountering political and financial obstacles or will need a much longer implementation period than the target date of 2003. Although the ESDP has been declared operational and able to perform the less demanding Petersberg tasks, the crucial issue of EU access to NATO's assets and capabilities remained unresolved. The reasons why the Headline Goal schedule has not been met are complex. While the EU has avoided falling into the trap of Europeanism-versus-Atlanticism, the scope of the ERRF has not yet been clearly defined. The issue of unavoidable but rational duplication of efforts by the EU and NATO has not been sufficiently addressed.

Defining the ESDP and building public support for increased spending will be challenging issues in the years ahead. Before the 11 September terrorist attacks the EU governments did not perceive an urgent need for military-related spending increases. Now their tax payers must be persuaded of the need to spend more. The European states have been slow to increase their military budgets, demonstrate flexibility and inventiveness in rationalizing procurement policies, and embark on regulation and restructuring of the defence industry. There is a need for a synergistic and rational approach to defence spending, and the creation of a single arms-procurement organization would make a positive contribution in this respect. The negative outcome of the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty in June 2001 underscored the gap and the need for dialogue between the public and government.

The lack of leadership within the EU, its cumbersome decision-making bodies and the propensity of the major EU governments to act alone in a crisis (as demonstrated during the November 2001 campaign in Afghanistan) illustrate the difficulty of forging a common foreign, security and defence policy. The future enlargement of the EU and NATO also pose challenges which may temporarily weaken the ESDP.

Chapter 4. The challenges of security sector reform

by Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka

About the author

* Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

States aspiring to democratic governance and strong economies require capable administrative and political structures. A key element is a well governed security sector, which comprises the civil, political and security institutions responsible for protecting the state and the communities within it. Reform or transformation of the security sector is a growing focus of international assistance. Past security assistance programmes were often ill-conceived and poorly implemented and resulted in outcomes that were not supportive of either citizen security or development goals. External forces have often supplanted the local security apparatus or, in some cases, explicitly sought to dismantle it where it was considered to be part of the problem.

The international community is seeking to respond in a more integrated manner to the violent conflicts and security problems facing states. Security sector reform is part of an attempt to develop a more coherent framework for reducing the risk that state weakness or failure will lead to disorder and violence. Where states are unable to manage developments within their borders successfully, the conditions are created for disorder and violence that may spill over onto the territory of other states and perhaps ultimately require an international intervention. Restoration of a viable national capacity in the security domain, based on mechanisms that ensure transparency and accountability, is a vital element of the overall effort to strengthen governance. Security sector reform aims to help states enhance the security of their citizens. There has been a shift from state- and military-centric notions of security to a greater emphasis on human security. This has underscored the importance of governance issues and civilian input into policy making.

Security sector reform has potentially wide-ranging implications for how state security establishments are organized and for how international security and development assistance is delivered. These implications are only just starting to be understood and translated into policy and are eliciting mixed reactions from both the international actors that provide security assistance and the recipients of aid. The Central and East European states have responded favourably to the reform agenda, which is seen to complement the wider economic and political reforms in which many of them are engaged. Crucially, the prospect of integration into NATO and 'the West' has provided a powerful, additional incentive for CEE states to reform their security sector. This cannot be matched by regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa, Asia or Latin America. In these regions the primary incentive for reform has been based largely on persuasion and the use of economic assistance.

Security sector reforms are a new area of activity for international actors, and there is still not a shared understanding at the international level of what this term means. This has limited the debate on the subject. Assisting in the development of such a shared understanding should be a priority objective for the research community.

The response of states to the 11 September terrorist attacks on the USA may delay the development of a security sector reform agenda. Increased importance is being placed on developing cooperation with the armed forces, intelligence services and law-enforcement services of other states to identify and eliminate groups and individuals engaged in terrorist acts. There is a risk that security sector reform will become subordinate to anti-terrorism activities in countries where the development of this cooperation is seen as particularly important.

Chapter 5. Sanctions applied by the European Union and the United Nations

Presentation by Ian Anthony

* Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

During 2001 sanctions continued to play an important role in the efforts to manage a range of security problems while the reform of sanctions witnessed towards the end of the 1990s continued. Both the United Nations and the European Union have been working to improve the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument for managing international security problems.

Although the word 'sanctions' is frequently used, it does not have an agreed definition. The UN Charter does not use the word at all but refers to measures that may be adopted in response to identified threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The implications of using sanctions against states are similar to a military action as their intent is always to inflict damage on the target. For this reason, the legitimacy of sanctions applied without a decision by the Security Council has been questioned.

Sanctions are now not only applied to target states, but also to non-state entities and, increasingly, to individuals. After the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September the UN Security Council agreed on extensive measures against groups and individuals that have carried out acts of terrorism. The use of sanctions against terrorism-a general and global threat rather than a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in a specific location-is unprecedented but draws heavily on recent UN experience with the development of targeted sanctions. However, it is not currently proposed to apply similar measures to other general threats identified by the Security Council.

The EU has established sanctions against states although the UN Security Council has not taken a similar decision. In some cases the EU has maintained its sanctions after the Security Council has decided to end UN measures. These decisions reflect the emergence of a political actor with an identity separate from the identity of its member states, since those states would not themselves have taken these decisions outside the EU context.

This is a distinctive approach to the use of sanctions in support of its CFSP. Sanctions are being used by the EU as one instrument to advance its objectives on democratization and human rights. The EU sanctions achieved some success in South-Eastern Europe when used as part of a broader set of security-building measures.

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