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High Representative’s briefing to the Security Council on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of Syrian Arab Republic (10 March 2022)

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High Representative’s briefing to the Security Council on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic Statement by Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

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Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Security Council,

I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief you again on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Since my last briefing on 28 February 2022, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has, as always, maintained regular contact with counterparts at the OPCW on its activities related to this matter.

As I have previously informed the Council, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic.

Nevertheless, the Secretariat maintains its readiness to deploy. Despite continued travel restrictions, the Technical Secretariat continues to undertake its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic to this end.

Mr. President,

Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) are still ongoing to clarify all the outstanding issues related to the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

I have been advised that the OPCW Secretariat has not yet received the requested declaration from the Syrian Arab Republic on all undeclared types and quantities of nerve agents produced and/or weaponised at a former chemical weapons production facility (CWPF) that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical warfare agents.

I have also been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested further information and documentation from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the damage caused during the 8 June attack on a military facility housing a declared former chemical weapons production facility. Nor has it received a response to the request for information regarding the unauthorised movement and remains of two destroyed cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018. In this regard, I call on the Syrian Arab Republic to respond to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests with the necessary urgency.

Mr. President,

I regret to inform Council members that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is still not in a position to conduct the twenty-fifth round of consultations in Damascus between the Syrian National Authority and the DAT due to the continued refusal by the Syrian Arab Republic to issue an entry visa for one member of the DAT. It is my understanding that although the exchange of correspondence between the OPCW Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority on this matter continues, the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to confirm that all visas requested by the Secretariat will be issued. I have been informed that the OPCW Technical Secretariat stands ready to deploy the DAT to the Syrian Arab Republic subject to the issuing of visas to all DAT members as well as the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.
I urge the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate arrangements for the deployment of the DAT and to comply with resolution 2118, including by allowing immediate and unfettered access for the personnel designated by the OPCW Secretariat as soon as possible.

Full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues. As has been stressed repeatedly, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Mr. President,

I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is planning to conduct the next rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in the course of 2022. Regarding the detection of a Schedule chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018, I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close this issue.

I note that preparations for the in-person meeting between the OPCW Director-General and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic remain ongoing.

The Technical Secretariat will keep the OPCW Executive Council informed of further developments on this matter.

Mr. President,

Consistent with previous updates to the Council, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.
I note that the OPCW Director-General monthly report refers to the FFM reports issued by the Technical Secretariat on 24 and 31 January 2022, which concluded that sulfur mustard was used in Marea on 1 September 2015 and that a chlorine cylinder was used as a weapon in Kafr Zeita on 1 October 2016, respectively. A copy of both FFM reports was circulated to members of the Security Council last month.

I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat planned to deploy the FFM to the Syrian Arab Republic from 22 January to 4 February 2022 to collect information and conduct interviews regarding incidents in the Aleppo Governorate in 2016. However, due to confirmed positive COVID-19 cases identified within the support team in Damascus, the deployment had to be postponed. The FFM is preparing for upcoming deployments, which remain subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Mr. President,

I understand that the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course, subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I take this opportunity to once again reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity, and independence of the work of the OPCW.

On the decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9) adopted on 21 April 2021, I have been informed that, unfortunately, the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/DEC.2. I, therefore, reiterate my call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in this regard.

Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Security Council,

The use of chemical weapons is a grave violation of international law and an affront to our shared humanity. We need to remain vigilant to ensure that those awful weapons are never used again, and are eliminated, not only in Syria, but everywhere. Let me close by assuring you of the United Nations’ commitment to work with all Member States to restore the taboo against chemical weapons and to ensure that those responsible for their use – having violated such a profound international norm – are held to account.

I thank you very much for your attention.