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Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process - Asia Report N°308 | 19 June 2020

Countries
Myanmar
Sources
ICG
Publication date
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The polls approaching in Myanmar are an opportunity for the government and ethnic armed groups to re-examine their positions in the country’s peace process. All parties should use the election-related hiatus to ask why talks have not succeeded and how to make them more productive.

Principal Findings

What’s new? After close to two years of a stagnating peace process, the Myanmar government, its military and ethnic armed groups signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement resumed negotiations aimed at holding a Panglong-21 peace conference later this year. The peace process will then enter hibernation while national elections take place.

Why does it matter? Recent negotiations have focused mainly on ensuring that the peace process continues after the election. But genuine progress toward ending Myanmar’s long-running ethnic conflicts is unlikely to be made without a decisive change in approach, particularly from the government.

What should be done? With the National League for Democracy likely to win another term, the government, military and ethnic armed groups should use the hibernation period constructively to review causes of the current impasse, rebuild trust through sustained informal dialogue, and take steps to reinvigorate the peace process from 2021.

Executive Summary

A flurry of negotiations among Myanmar’s government, its military and ethnic armed groups belies deeper problems in the country’s moribund peace process. The government and armed groups that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) are eager to hold a Panglong-21 peace conference before electoral dy­namics take precedence later this year. As a result, two prominent armed groups that had suspended their participation have formally re-entered the peace process. Although these are positive developments, even if it takes place the conference would be largely symbolic and do little to address the fundamental obstacles on Myanmar’s road toward sustainable peace. By putting formal negotiations on hold for at least six months, the election and subsequent transition period constitute a unique opportunity for a rethink. All parties involved should use this window to examine blockages that have hindered genuine progress so far, multiply informal meetings to rebuild trust and examine ways of reinvigorating the peace process from 2021.

and the overwhelming Burman dominance in political institutions. The discontent is most evident in Rakhine State, where the political marginalisation of the Rakhine ethnic minority under the NLD has boosted support for the Arakan Army insurgency. Armed conflict and insecurity are likely to result in the cancellation of voting in some constituencies in minority areas, particularly in Rakhine State, which will only deepen local minorities’ alienation.
The election period, however, will also be an opportunity to reflect on how to take the peace process forward. The formal negotiations will likely be put on hold for six to twelve months, until after the next cabinet is sworn in (scheduled for late March 2021). The current government, the military and ethnic armed groups should use this period to review their own strategy and goals, ramp up informal dialogue and examine crucial issues that have so far been put aside, such as the growth of the illicit economy and the mounting might of military-aligned militias. Even if the COVID19 pandemic delays the Panglong-21 conference, there will still be a significant period during which formal peace negotiations will not take place. This downtime constitutes a unique opportunity for all parties to reflect on how to restart the process with a more constructive approach in 2021.
If the NLD forms the next government, as appears likely, it should use its second term in office to reinvigorate its leadership of the peace process. Overcoming the deadlock in negotiations toward a political settlement requires a fundamental shift in approach. As a first step, Naypyitaw should overhaul institutions like the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre, to rely less on former government bureaucrats and instead draw in new negotiators and advisers from a range of backgrounds, such as business, academia and civil society. The key to substantive progress, however, lies in renewed political commitment from Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD to the peace process, a stronger sense of empathy with the grievances of ethnic minorities, and a clear vision for where the peace process is going.