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The AU re-takes the lead in Central Africa

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Special focus on regional economic communities: The complexity of the relationship between the AU and regional organisations is evident in the handling of the crisis in the Central African Republic.

At a time when the African Union (AU) seeks to re-evaluate and redefine its relationship with regional economic communities (RECs) as part of the reforms adopted by the organisation, the Central African Republic (CAR) provides a test case for the tricky relationship between these two levels of African governance.

The AU and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have taken turns leading the peace process in the CAR. Earlier on in the crisis, in 2013, this was done to the detriment of a proper collaborative approach that could have yielded a better outcome for the CAR and its people.

A proper collaborative approach could have yielded a better outcome for the CAR and its people

The idea of a division of labour between the AU and RECs – the AU and ECCAS, in this case – is a noble one. However, it risks colliding with the reality of power politics and the complexity of applying the principle of subsidiarity.

AU and ECCAS hesitate to speak out about Central Africa

ECCAS is the subregional organisation for the central African region as recognised by the AU. Its members are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and São Tomé and Príncipe.

The relationship between ECCAS and the AU on questions of conflict prevention has been complex

Over the past few years the relationship between ECCAS and the AU on questions of conflict prevention and management has been complex. For instance, ECCAS has been silent on the situation in Gabon. However, the AU issued a communiqué in November 2018 in response to the unilateral constitutional amendment made by Gabon’s constitutional court, the second controversial constitutional change that year. ECCAS has been equally silent about Burundi, while the AU has, on several occasions, particularly in 2015, looked into the situation there.

Both ECCAS and the AU have, however, refrained from engaging in Cameroon, notably in what is now an open conflict in the north-west and south-west regions of the country.

Political instability has also rocked Chad and the Republic of Congo. In Chad, in 2018, a constitutional amendment reinforced the powers of the president. Meanwhile the country saw a wave of social protests and a rebellion taking root in the north that threatened the N’djamena regime and was quelled with the help of the French military.

In the Republic of Congo, a 2015 controversial referendum was held to allow the president to run for a third term. This was followed by a botched presidential election that led to the crisis in the Pool region of the country, with dire humanitarian consequences. Neither ECCAS nor the AU arbitrated in those cases.

The Central African Republic: a revealing case

The CAR provides a good illustration of the complex relationship between ECCAS and the AU, as well as potential lessons for how they could better work together.

When the CAR conflict erupted in 2012, ECCAS was present in the country through the Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique (MICOPAX), deployed in 2008. In 2012 ECCAS conducted the first mediation engagements between the CAR government and the Seleka rebel group, leading up to the signing of the January 2013 peace agreement in Libreville, under the aegis of the subregional body. ECCAS was therefore involved in what could be described as an attempt to prevent a conflict that nonetheless erupted and swept away the regime of president François Bozizé in March 2013.